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“HUMESPEAK”: THE SDLP, POLITICAL DISCOURSE, 
AND THE NORTHERN IRELAND PEACE PROCESS 
 
P. J. McLoughlin* 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores the vital role played by the Social Democratic and 
Labour Party (SDLP) in the formulation of a new political discourse and 
conceptual approach to the Northern Ireland problem. In particular, it 
shows how John Hume, party leader through the 1980s and 1990s, helped 
to propagate this discourse, and in doing so influenced policy-making in 
London and Dublin, and thinking within the republican movement. 
Although the paper emphasises the importance of this influence, it 
concludes by considering the reasons why the Ulster unionist community 
have remained so unreceptive to the political discourse of Hume and the 
SDLP. 
Introduction 
 
This article examines the political discourse of Northern Ireland‟s 
SDLP. In doing so, it aims to show that many of the concepts and themes of 
the SDLP‟s discourse helped to shape the ideological parameters of the 
Northern Ireland peace process. In this, the article is limited in its scope. 
Clearly, a great number of actors have contributed to the discourse and 
ideology of the Northern Ireland peace process, and there is not room here to 
explain the way that the SDLP‟s ideas have interacted with those of other 
parties to the conflict. In particular, changes in northern Irish nationalist 
thinking – many of which have involved the SDLP – have both fed upon and 
fed into similar shifts in southern Irish nationalist ideology. As such, whilst 
the focus here is in on the SDLP, the party should be considered as part of 
the wider Irish nationalist “family”. Accordingly, this article is intended as a 
contribution to the wider literature on the evolution of Irish nationalist 
discourse. For the SDLP‟s discursive and ideological innovations must be 
seen as related to and interactive with changes in the language of other 
members of the broader nationalist family.
1
 
In order to draw out the SDLP‟s role in this complex process, the 
article focuses on a select number of concepts which were particularly 
common to the party‟s discourse from the 1970s through to the 1990s. It 
does not claim that these concepts were completely unique to the SDLP, and 
indeed aims to show that other actors were often thinking in similar ways. 
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However, the article explains how the party deployed these concepts in a 
consistent, almost idiosyncratic fashion, a style which served to make such 
ideas part of the SDLP‟s own distinctive language and ideological approach 
to the Northern Ireland problem. In turn, it shows how some of the SDLP‟s 
particular word formations were adopted by other parties to the problem, and 
thus became integral to the language of the Northern Ireland peace process. 
In doing so, the paper lays great emphasis on the role of John Hume, leader 
of the SDLP from 1979 to 2001. Such was Hume‟s importance in the 
propagation of the SDLP‟s ideas that his distinctive political parlance even 
earned it own epithet: “Humespeak”. Though this term was often used 
disparagingly – referring to the repetitiveness of his language – even critics 
recognise the extent to which Hume‟s particular phraseology has dominated 
the discourse of the peace process (Cunningham, 1997; McGovern, 1997).  
The specific concepts which the paper examines are “the three strands”, 
“the Irish dimension”, “the two traditions”, and finally the notion of “an 
agreed Ireland”. Whilst exploring each of these terms individually, the paper 
aims to show that they are interrelated, and together form a mode of political 
discourse distinctive to the SDLP. Having considered these concepts, and the 
extent to which they influenced the thinking of the British and Irish 
governments, the paper then looks at a specific debate which took place 
between the SDLP and the republican movement from the late-1980s. This 
dialogue, revolving around the issue of British interests in Northern Ireland, 
proved crucial to the evolution of republican thinking, and the subsequent 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) ceasefire of August 1994. In this respect, the 
etymological origins of the peace process can again be related to the SDLP, 
and in particular to the party‟s leader in this period. 
 
The Three Strands 
 
As Gerard Murray‟s meticulous study of the SDLP has shown, a three-level 
approach towards the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict was 
conceived by the party as early as 1971 (1998, pp. 15-16), that is a over a 
quarter of a century before the 1998 Good Friday Agreement (GFA) created 
a political settlement by the same means. This approach was initiated by 
John Duffy, one of the SDLP‟s earliest policy-makers, in a set of internal 
party papers which he completed in September 1971. Duffy‟s papers 
described three sets of relationships which he felt must be addressed in order 
to resolve the Northern Ireland problem: relations between the two 
communities in Northern Ireland; relations between the North and South of 
Ireland; and relations between Britain and Ireland (Murray, 1998, p. 15).  
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It was only in the 1980s, however, that this three relations thinking 
became evident in the SDLP‟s public discourse. Arguably, this reflected the 
political developments in this period, which created a context more 
favourable to the three relationships approach. In particular, the warming of 
relations between the British and Irish governments, culminating in the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985, appeared to broaden the framework 
within which the Northern Ireland problem was being considered. This met 
with positive response from the SDLP, with Hume telling the British House 
of Commons that the AIA provided 
[for] the first time … a real framework within which to address the 
problem. The problem is not just about relationships within Northern 
Ireland ... it is about relationships in Ireland and between Britain and 
Ireland (Hansard, sixth series, vol. 87, col. 780). 
Through the remainder of the 1980s, Hume continued to articulate this 
three relationships approach as the most appropriate way to resolve the 
Northern Ireland problem. His persistence, it seems, eventually paid off. 
Indeed, for when the Northern Ireland Secretary, Peter Brooke, announced 
his intention to convene political talks between the local parties in March 
1991, he told the House of Commons that “discussions must focus on the 
three main relationships: those in Northern Ireland … among the people of 
the island of Ireland; and between the governments” (Hansard, sixth series, 
vol. 188, col. 765).  
By the time the Brooke talks began, the three relationships had been 
rebranded as “the three strands” by British officials. However, the origins of 
this approach in the thinking of the SDLP were plain to see. Moreover, when 
Brooke was replaced by Patrick Mayhew in April 1992, the new Northern 
Ireland Secretary continued to organise inter-party talks in accordance with 
the three strand model. Although these discussions ended with little progress, 
when negotiations recommenced in 1996, again they were based upon the 
three strands. Eventually, the talks concluded in April 1998 with the 
announcement of the GFA. This Agreement established new political 
institutions to accommodate the two communities in Northern Ireland; new 
arrangements to facilitate co-operation between the North and South of 
Ireland; and new structures to co-ordinate relations throughout the UK and 
Ireland.
2
     
The particular design of the political institutions created under each 
strand of the GFA were, of course, the result of bargain and compromise 
between the Northern Ireland parties and the British and Irish governments 
(see Hennessy, 2000). However, that the GFA was drawn from the three 
strands schema shows how the SDLP shaped the basic terms of the 
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settlement. For, as demonstrated, the three strands approach finds its origins 
in documents written by the party in the early 1970s. The three-level thinking 
of these documents, promoted more vigorously by the SDLP from the 1980s 
onwards, shows the significant influence which the party had in creating the 
essential parameters of the peace agreement that emerged in 1998. 
 
The Irish Dimension 
 
“The Irish dimension” is a term which the SDLP used to refer to the need for 
a political settlement which extended beyond Northern Ireland, involving the 
Irish as well as the British state. In this respect, the concept ties in with the 
party‟s three relationship thinking, and particularly the emphasis on relations 
between the North and South of Ireland. For the SDLP, political linkages 
between the two jurisdictions were required to give institutional expression 
to the identity of Northern Ireland‟s nationalist community. Just as the 
British identity of the Ulster unionist community was reflected in the Union 
with Great Britain, so, the SDLP argued, the Irish identity of the northern 
nationalist community must be recognised through political structures 
connecting it with the Republic of Ireland. As Hume reasoned:   
Any solution which does not take account of the Irish dimension is 
doomed to failure. SDLP policies clearly commit the Party to a solution 
that takes account of both basic loyalties in the community and both 
must be taken into account if any solution is to be found (Irish News, 
22 May 1975). 
The party‟s emphasis on the need for an Irish dimension to any 
settlement of the Northern Ireland problem has led the term to become very 
much associated with the SDLP. However, the phrase was actually first used 
in a British government document, The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper 
for Discussion (1972). Here the term was used to suggest that any regional 
settlement  
must also recognise Northern Ireland‟s position within Ireland as a 
whole … Whatever arrangements are made for the future 
administration of Northern Ireland must take account of the region‟s 
relationship with the Republic of Ireland (HMSO, 1972, paras. 76, 78). 
The SDLP read this as an acceptance by the London government of the 
arguments advanced in Towards a New Ireland – a document which the 
party had issued a month before the British discussion paper. In Towards a 
New Ireland, the SDLP had firmly set its face against any internal solution to 
the Northern Ireland problem: “Any re-examination [of constitutional 
arrangements] must therefore take place, not in a purely Six County
3
 context, 
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but in an Irish context” (SDLP, 1972, p. 1). In this, the SDLP made clear that 
it would not be party to a settlement that did not involve the Irish 
government in some way. As such, when London seemed to accept this 
position by recognising an “Irish dimension” to the problem in The Future of 
Northern Ireland, the SDLP seized upon what was actually a Whitehall term 
(Irish News, 8 November 1972), adopting the phrase as part of its own 
political nomenclature, and using it henceforth. 
The Irish dimension found its first institutional expression in the 
Council of Ireland which formed part of the failed Sunningdale Agreement 
of 1973. Like the North-South structures created by the GFA 25 years later, 
the Council of Ireland was intended to promote co-operation between the two 
parts of the island. However, whereas the all-Ireland institutions of the GFA 
were sharply defined, the powers and political remit of those agreed in 1973 
were more open to interpretation. For this reason, many unionists opposed 
the Council of Ireland, believing that it would work to erode the Irish border, 
and undermine Northern Ireland‟s position within the UK. This concern 
ultimately led to the collapse of the Sunningdale Agreement, and the inter-
communal power-sharing government which it had created for Northern 
Ireland.  
Because unionist opposition to Sunningdale had been directed mainly 
towards the Council of Ireland, following the Agreement‟s demise, the 
London government moved away from the idea of an institutionalised Irish 
dimension. The feeling amongst British officials was that the Council of 
Ireland had been a step too far for unionists. Had the Sunningdale settlement 
involved only a power-sharing arrangement within Northern Ireland, it may 
have survived. The SDLP, on the other hand, remained firmly opposed to 
any internal settlement of the Northern Ireland problem, arguing that this 
would deny the political identity of the nationalist community. Even in the 
immediate aftermath of Sunningdale‟s collapse, the party responded 
vigorously to media speculation that this might lead to a weakening of the 
SDLP‟s commitment to North-South institutions. “The Irish dimension is 
fundamental to SDLP policy”, argued Austin Currie, a co-founder and 
leading member of the party: “Whether or not it is realised in a Council of 
Ireland or any other structure is a matter for discussion” (Irish Times, 19 June 
1974). 
Through the political inertia of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
SDLP continued to hold to this line, insisting that the Irish government‟s 
involvement in Northern Ireland was a sine qua non of any settlement to 
which it would be a party. In defending this position, the SDLP used the term 
“the Irish dimension” so frequently that, as suggested, the phrase came to be 
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considered as one of party‟s own. Even the British government – at this time 
looking to distance itself from the whole notion of an Irish dimension – 
appeared happy to forget that the phrase had first appeared in one of its own 
discussion papers. But whilst the term was invented in Whitehall, the idea of 
an Irish dimension was integral to the SDLP‟s thinking – as was evident in 
the party‟s earliest political documents (Murray, 1998, pp.12ff). Moreover, 
by continually using a phrase coined by British officials, the SDLP made it 
impossible for the Irish dimension to slip from the political agenda. By 
refusing to contemplate any settlement which did not involve the Irish 
government, the SDLP effectively vetoed any movement by London towards 
an internal solution of the Northern Ireland problem – an option obviously 
favoured by the unionist community.  
Of course, the Dublin government was also crucial in pushing the Irish 
dimension. In particular, in the early 1980s, the administrations of Garret 
FitzGerald carefully avoided any anti-partitionist rhetoric, but insisted that 
Dublin should play some role in the administration of Northern Ireland. An 
Irish presence in the structures of governance in the region, it was argued, 
would serve to address the sense of political alienation that had become 
apparent amongst the nationalist minority in this period (FitzGerald, 1991, 
pp. 473ff). As such, it was not only the SDLP‟s obstinacy over the Irish 
dimension, but also the Dublin government‟s insistence that it should be 
involved in Northern Ireland, and indeed the sympathy for this position 
among the international community, particular in the US, that together 
pushed the British government towards the logic of the 1985 AIA. Under the 
terms of this accord, Dublin was given a limited but nonetheless significant 
role in the governance of Northern Ireland. More than a decade after 
Sunningdale‟s demise, the Irish dimension was restored. 
Although the 1998 GFA ostensibly “transcended” the AIA, the 
essential architecture of the earlier accord remains in place. Despite unionist 
opposition, the inter-governmental institutions of the AIA were reformed 
rather than replaced by the GFA (O‟Leary, 2001, p. 68). The SDLP had some 
influence in this decision, with the party still opposed to any settlement 
lacking an Irish input. However, more important was opinion in London and 
Dublin. In essence, the two governments were unwilling to abandon the 
political machinery which had, since the mid-1980s, allowed for far more 
effective management of the Northern Ireland problem. As such, under the 
terms of the GFA, Dublin retains the role it has held since 1985, as guardian 
of the nationalist minority‟s essential interests. This, in addition to the new 
North-South structures created by the GFA, shows that the Irish dimension is 
still in effect. 
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The role in Northern Ireland which the Dublin government acquired 
through the AIA, and the position which it continues to hold today, is less 
than the SDLP would have liked. In 1985, the party had been hoping for 
something closer to joint British-Irish sovereignty over Northern Ireland. In 
1998, the SDLP had sought North-South structures with greater political 
potential, institutions which could have evolved with more dynamism, 
leading ultimately to the reunification of Ireland. However, the Irish 
dimension to both the AIA and the GFA owes much to the SDLP‟s refusal to 
accept anything less than the British government had originally offered in its 
1972 discussion paper.  
 
The Two Traditions 
 
The idea of “the two traditions” – or the same concept articulated in different 
terms – appeared in nationalist commentaries some years before the onset of 
the Northern Ireland conflict. Indeed, John Whyte highlights the 1950s in 
particular as a period in which mainly southern writers such as Michael 
Sheehy and Donal Barrington began to consider the problem of partition in 
terms of “two distinct peoples in Ireland” (Whyte, 1990, pp. 119-20). In this 
interpretation, partition was not imposed upon Ireland by the British 
government, but a rather an inevitable response by London to the seemingly 
irreconcilable differences of these two “peoples”: Irish nationalists and 
Ulster unionists. Implicit in this thesis was the idea that it was for the 
“peoples” of Ireland – with the emphasis being on nationalists – to work to 
overcome those differences. This, it was suggested, was the only way to end 
partition and unite Ireland. 
Following the outbreak of communal violence in Northern Ireland in 
the late 1960s, and the formation of the SDLP in 1970, the new party clearly 
drew upon these ideas, articulating a gradualist approach towards Irish unity 
as the ultimate solution to the conflict.
4
 However, the party also used this 
discourse of divided peoples – or “the two traditions” as it became in the 
SDLP‟s phraseology – in explaining its immediate proposals for the 
pacification and stabilisation of Northern Ireland. For this end, the SDLP 
argued, could only be achieved by establishing political structures which 
recognised the identity of both political “traditions” in Northern Ireland, Irish 
nationalist and Ulster unionist (SDLP, 1972, p. 4; 1974a, para. 1.3). In 
essence, this meant creating an Irish dimension – that is all-Ireland political 
structures – as a counterbalance to the pre-existing British dimension – 
namely the political Union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As 
the party plainly stated in its 1975 manifesto: “There is an Irish Dimension to 
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the problem. There is a British Dimension to the problem. Any solution must 
take account of both” (SDLP, 1975, p. 3).  
In effect, then, the SDLP used this two traditions thesis to support its 
arguments in favour of an Irish dimension. This tendency was most notable 
in the period after Sunningdale‟s collapse. At this time, many commentators 
proposed that the SDLP abandon its pursuit of an Irish dimension, and 
content itself with an internal settlement of the Northern Ireland problem – 
this, it was claimed, being the only basis on which unionists might be 
persuaded to share power with the nationalists. The SDLP rejected such 
suggestions, arguing that without institutional recognition of its Irish 
identity, the nationalist minority could not be accommodated within the 
Northern Ireland state (SDLP, 1974a, paragraphs 1.1-1.3). The two traditions 
thesis thus provided the ideological rationale for the party‟s continued 
commitment to the Sunningdale formula of power-sharing and an Irish 
dimension. As Hume reasoned: 
Partnership between our two traditions – both within the North through 
power-sharing, and between North and South through the Irish 
dimension – accepting and respecting our differences will in time build 
trust and confidence to replace distrust and prejudice (Sunday Press, 16 
March 1975). 
In the late 1970s, such arguments made little headway with either the 
unionist community or the British government. Buoyed by their defeat of 
Sunningdale, from 1974 onwards, unionists became increasingly inflexible. 
Not only did they remain opposed to the idea of linkages between the North 
and South of Ireland, but unionist leaders now refused to share power with 
the SDLP even within a wholly internal political arrangement.  The British 
government, meanwhile, was unwilling to enforce a settlement upon an 
intransigent majority, and so appeared to abandon all hope of establishing a 
local settlement in Northern Ireland. Instead it settled into the role of ruling 
the region directly from Westminster. This seemed to appease the unionist 
community. After all, direct rule from London secured the majority‟s 
essential political objective, maintenance of the Union with Britain. The 
nationalist community, on the other hand, grew increasingly disaffected. 
Recognising this, the SDLP continued to press for a change in British policy 
towards an arrangement that would acknowledge the identity of both 
communities. As Hume argued: 
The problem here cannot be solved on the basis of one identity alone 
and whether wittingly or unwittingly, British politicians run the risk of 
promoting violence in the North by not accommodating the two 
different identities in it (Irish News, 9 May 1978).  
“Humespeak”: The SDLP  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 103 - 
 
The extent of the minority community‟s alienation became apparent in 
the early 1980s, when republican prisoners began a series of hunger strikes in 
order to gain political recognition from the British government. The hunger 
strikes mobilised even moderate sections of the Catholic community, those 
who had shown no previous sympathy for the republican movement. In turn, 
this led to fears in both London and Dublin that the moderate nationalism of 
the SDLP would now be eclipsed by the radical republicanism of Sinn Féin 
(Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 2002, p. 202). 
It was partly to restore the credibility of the SDLP that the Taoiseach, 
Garret FitzGerald, established the New Ireland Forum of 1983-4. This 
initiative, originally proposed by the SDLP (Murray, p. 124),
5
 brought the 
northern nationalist party into conference with its southern counterparts, 
Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and the Labour Party. Although contemporary 
commentators derided the exercise as attempt by the Irish establishment to 
“save” the SDLP, the party had ambitions beyond its electoral struggle with 
Sinn Féin. It hoped to use the Forum to forge an ideological consensus 
among constitutional nationalists in both parts of Ireland, creating a unity of 
purpose that would, along with the goodwill of the international community, 
press the British government into action on Northern Ireland (Hume, 1984, p. 
24). The SDLP‟s success in achieving such consensus was evident in the 
conclusion of the New Ireland Forum report, which committed all of the 
participating parties to the two traditions thesis as the basis for a solution: 
The validity of both the nationalist and unionist identities in Ireland … 
must be accepted; both of these identities must have equally 
satisfactory, secure and durable, political, administrative and symbolic 
expression and protection (Dublin Stationery Office, 1984, article 
5.2.4). 
Although the 1985 AIA did not adopt any of the specific political 
structures that were proposed by the New Ireland Forum, it certainly drew 
upon the thinking behind the initiative. As Todd argues: 
Explicitly, the AIA recognized the need to acknowledge the rights of 
the two traditions in Ireland and to … recognize the identities of the 
two communities in Northern Ireland … 
   The implication, when the AIA is read in the light of the New Ireland 
Forum Report, is that the nationalist community in Northern Ireland as 
a part of the wider Irish nationalist tradition has a right to the 
institutionalized recognition of its identity … through the involvement 
of the Irish government in Northern Ireland (1995, p. 822).  
The same political logic and discourse informed the terms of the 
Northern Ireland peace process from its earliest days. This was clear to see in 
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the Joint Declaration for Peace – or the Downing Street Declaration (DSD) 
as it is more commonly known – which formally launched the process in 
December 1993. Here the British government promised to work with its Irish 
counterpart to 
encourage, facilitate and enable the achievement of … an agreement 
over a period through a process of dialogue and co-operation based on 
full respect for the rights and identities of both traditions in Ireland 
(HMSO, 1993, para. 4).  
In the 1995 Framework Documents – wherein the two governments 
provided the blueprint for a political settlement in Northern Ireland – the 
influence of the two traditions discourse was even more evident in the 
stipulation that “any new political arrangements must be based on full 
respect for, and protection and expression of, the rights and identities of both 
traditions in Ireland” (HMSO, 1995, para. 10 (iv)). Finally, the GFA was 
also suffused with a language with recognised the equal legitimacy of the 
two political traditions in Ireland (see the Agreement, Constitutional Issues, 
para. 1(v-vi)).  
All of these references show the extent to which the two traditions 
discourse became ingrained within the philosophy of the peace process. 
However, again this mode of thought can be related to ideas first expressed 
by the SDLP in the 1970s. Although the party was itself drawing on southern 
nationalist commentaries from the 1950s, the SDLP modified this thinking to 
reflect the contemporary situation in Northern Ireland. Specifically, the party 
developed practical proposals which – though based upon the rethinking of 
the 1950s – were not geared solely towards Irish unification, and in fact 
provided a conceptual framework within which Irish nationalist and Ulster 
unionist could both be accommodated in a still partitioned Ireland. In 
addition, it was the SDLP‟s frequent and repeated use of a specific term, “the 
two traditions”, that led to its subsequent adoption by the British and Irish 
governments, and thus its establishment as a central discourse of the peace 
process  
 
An Agreed Ireland 
 
Of all the concepts considered in this paper, the idea of an “agreed Ireland” is 
the one most intimately associated with Hume. However, it also relates to the 
concepts already discussed, particularly the two traditions thesis. Indeed, the 
idea built directly upon this thesis, suggesting that the two political 
communities in Ireland had to find mutually acceptable constitutional 
structures that would allow them to co-exist on the island which they shared 
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– hence an agreed Ireland. Like the two traditions thesis, the concept of an 
agreed Ireland also became more prominent within the SDLP‟s discourse in 
the aftermath of the failed Sunningdale Agreement, when the party tried to 
argue the validity of the power-sharing and Irish dimension formula which 
unionists had rejected (see SDLP, 1974b). However, it also appeared that 
Hume employed the phrase, an agreed Ireland, as a way to sate or at least to 
address the traditional nationalist desire for a united Ireland. For he used the 
term to suggest that any settlement which gave the two communities in 
Northern Ireland an equal say in the governance of the region, and any 
agreement which allowed nationalists to express a political affiliation with 
the southern Irish state, would in itself constitute “Irish unity”. For example, 
speaking shortly after the collapse of Sunningdale, Hume argued that: 
If we get an agreed Ireland that is unity. What constitutional or 
institutional forms such an agreed Ireland takes is irrelevant because it 
would represent agreement by the people of this country as to how they 
should be governed (Irish Times, 17 June 1974). 
This was an idea which Hume continued to articulate, ad infinitum, 
from the 1970s onwards. But whilst unionists vehemently opposed the all-
Ireland implications of his thinking, Hume‟s arguments did eventually find 
favour with the two governments. This was most apparent in the DSD of 
1993, where the British government stated that its primary interest was “to 
see peace, stability and reconciliation established by agreement among all the 
people who inhabit the island,” and committed itself to “work with the Irish 
Government to achieve such an agreement … based on full respect for the 
rights and identities of both traditions …” (HMSO, 1993, para. 4). With this, 
Hume‟s notion of an agreed Ireland became the ideological template for a 
solution to the Northern Ireland problem (Bew, Gibbon and Patterson, 2002, 
pp. 221-2). Though broadly flexible as to the particular political structures 
that would be created, this model provided two guiding principles to the 
subsequent inter-party talks. Any solution arising from these discussions 
would have to include all-Ireland institutions, and must win the consent of 
both political traditions.  
The agreement that eventually emerged in 1998 is consistent with this 
model. Indeed, with the North-South structures created by the GFA, northern 
Catholics no longer reside in a polity entirely separate from that of their co-
nationals in the Republic of Ireland. The minority community‟s Irish identity 
is explicitly recognised by the Agreement (Agreement, Constitutional Issues, 
para. 1(vi)). By the same token, the Union between Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland remains intact; unionists‟ political identity has in no way 
been diminished. In this, the GFA has created a political framework capable 
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of accommodating both traditions on the island of Ireland. Hume‟s 
contribution to the conception of this framework, and in particular his idea of 
an agreed Ireland, was highly significant. 
 
“No Selfish Strategic or Economic Interest” 
 
Having explored four major concepts which contributed to the discourse and 
thinking of the Northern Ireland peace process, it is now worth considering 
the particular political exchanges which led to the cessation of hostilities in 
the mid-1990s. For here again, we can see the influence of the SDLP, 
particularly in the verbal formulations that were used.  
Of crucial importance was the dialogue between the SDLP and Sinn 
Féin which began in 1988. This debate was, in the first instance, inspired by 
the two parties‟ rival interpretations of the 1985 AIA. Sinn Féin saw the 
Agreement as an imperialist stratagem: by allowing Dublin a limited role in 
the administration of the region, republicans felt that London was trying to 
stabilise British rule in Northern Ireland (Sinn Féin, 1986). The SDLP, 
however, saw the AIA in quite a different light. In particular, Hume focused 
on Article 1(c) of the Agreement, wherein the British government had 
promised to support and indeed legislate for a united Ireland if this was 
shown to be the wish of a majority within Northern Ireland. Hume presented 
this commitment as, effectively, a declaration of British neutrality on the 
future of Northern Ireland. With this, he sought to overturn republicans‟ 
imperial interpretation of the conflict: 
This is a clear statement by the British government that it has no 
interest of its own, either strategic or otherwise, in remaining in Ireland. 
It is a declaration that Irish unity is a matter for Irish people, for those 
who want it to persuade those who don‟t (Hume, 1986, p. 382).  
Publicly, Sinn Féin rejected Hume‟s reading of the AIA. But behind 
closed doors, a debate was taking place within the republican movement. 
After the astonishing electoral gains of the early 1980s, Sinn Féin had 
reached a ceiling in its political support. This was partly attributable to the 
AIA, which has restored the confidence of constitutional nationalism, but 
more important was Sinn Féin‟s relationship with the IRA. Whilst it 
continued to defend the actions of the IRA, Sinn Féin found that it could not 
win significant support beyond the republican heartlands, where Catholic 
voters remained loyal to the SDLP. If Sinn Féin was to have any influence 
beyond its core constituency, it would have to engage with its moderate rival. 
Recognising this, the Sinn Féin leader, Gerry Adams, began to put out 
political feelers towards the SDLP (Adams, 2003 pp. 53ff.)     
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In spite of the risks involved, Hume finally agreed to formal talks with 
Sinn Féin, beginning in early 1988. In essence, the SDLP used these 
discussions to restate and refine its reading of the AIA, and in particular its 
view that the British government was now neutral on the possibility of Irish 
unity. As Hume argued in a letter delivered to Adams at the outset of the 
talks: “Britain is now saying that she has no interest of her own in being here 
and that her only interest is to see agreement among the people who share the 
island of Ireland” (Hume, 1988, p. 4). For the SDLP, therefore, the British 
government was not the primary obstacle to Irish reunification. Rather it was 
the unionist community, and their deep-rooted resistance to that end. Thus, 
the key to achieving a united Ireland was to persuade unionists to consent to 
it.  
Despite such arguments, throughout the 1988 talks, Sinn Féin 
stubbornly rejected the idea of British neutrality on Northern Ireland, and 
restated their old colonial interpretation of the conflict: 
The claim that Britain is neutral ignores their role as a pawnbroker and 
guarantor of unionist hegemony … Britain‟s continuing involvement in 
Ireland is based on strategic, economic and political interests (Sinn 
Féin, 1988, p. 12). 
Although the SDLP-Sinn Féin talks appeared to end in stalemate, 
Hume took what republicans had said here as a challenge (Hume, 1996, p. 
115). He now turned to London, seeking confirmation – straight from the 
horse‟s mouth as it were – of his conception of the AIA and of British 
neutrality vis-à-vis Irish unity. Peter Brooke, the Northern Ireland Secretary 
from 1989, proved receptive to Hume‟s approaches, and took seriously his 
suggestion that the republican leadership was becoming more open-minded 
(Mallie and McKitterick, 1996, pp. 107-8). Brooke responded in a speech to 
his Westminster constituency on November 9th 1990, in which he famously 
declared that: “The British government has no selfish strategic or economic 
interests in Northern Ireland” (Irish Times, 10 November 1990). The striking 
similarities between this formula and the terms in which Sinn Féin had 
rejected the SDLP‟s neutrality thesis seem more than coincidental. It appears 
that someone was telling Brooke exactly what republicans needed to hear a 
British minister say.  
Following Brooke‟s speech, Hume was able to return to Adams 
claiming vindication of his interpretation of the AIA. This led to further talks 
between the two leaders which evolved into the so-called “Hume-Adams 
initiative”. The essential purpose of this initiative was to find agreement on a 
form of words – acceptable to the British and Irish governments, but also to 
the republican movement – which would be included in a joint London-
“Humespeak”: The SDLP  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 108 - 
 
Dublin declaration regarding the terms on which Sinn Féin could join all-
party talks towards a settlement in Northern Ireland. Though understandably 
unnerving Ulster unionists, the Hume-Adams dialogue achieved huge 
support throughout nationalist Ireland, and eventually forced the two 
governments to respond with the DSD of December 1993 (Mallie and 
McKittrick, 1996, pp. 117ff.). 
The phraseology of the DSD stands as a testament to the extent to 
which the document drew upon the Hume-Adams initiative, despite 
presentation to the contrary (Bew, Patterson and Teague, 1997, pp. 205-6). In 
order to maintain unionist support for the process, the two governments 
could not be seen to adopt a text which Adams had any part in creating, the 
Sinn Féin leader being seen as a terrorist in Protestant eyes. But though the 
terms of the Hume-Adams dialogue were diluted, the primary inspiration for 
the DSD was plain to see. Most significant in the text was an affirmation of 
the position given by Brooke three years previously, the British government 
declaring that it had “no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern 
Ireland”, and thus represented no barrier to a united Ireland achieved by 
peaceful means (HMSO, 1993, para. 4).  
After considerable deliberation with the republican movement, the IRA 
eventually responded to the DSD by calling a ceasefire in August 1994. The 
DSD, of course, was not the sole reason for this shift in strategy. Indeed, the 
republican movement had for some years been moving towards a more 
political approach (English, 2003, pp. 187ff). 
Moreover, if any one explanation can be given for the cessation of the armed 
campaign, it was the realisation that, though the IRA could no be defeated, 
neither did it have the military capacity to force the British state from 
Northern Ireland. By the late 1980s, many senior republicans had accepted 
this reality. However, persuading the movement as a whole to abandon the 
armed struggle and adopt a purely political strategy was no easy task. Crucial 
in the process were the various statements regarding British interests in 
Northern Ireland that were made in the early 1990s. These allowed the Sinn 
Féin leadership to suggest that there had been a radical shift in British policy 
towards Northern Ireland, and that this should be tested by republicans‟ also 
changing tack.  
On this level, the early peace process appeared as a game played 
essentially between the British state and the republican movement. However, 
as demonstrated, Hume and the SDLP helped to write the script for the 
crucial first exchanges between the two sides. Prior to the SDLP-Sinn Féin 
talks of 1988, republicans appeared unwilling to even entertain the idea of 
British neutrality regarding Northern Ireland. But as well as creating such 
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thoughts amongst the Sinn Féin leadership, Hume prompted the British 
government to make public announcements that would encourage the 
acceptance of such ideas amongst the wider republican movement. These 
statements proved vital to the development of the Northern Ireland peace 
process. In particular, without the “no selfish strategic or economic interests” 
mantra repeated by British officials throughout the early 1990s, there would 
have been no IRA ceasefire in 1994, and no peace agreement in 1998. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The great historical legacy of the SDLP, and of John Hume in 
particular, lies in redefining Irish nationalism. I deliberately do not say 
Northern nationalism, as I believe the SDLP has radically changed the 
thinking of the mainstream political parties in the South, as well as the 
broad mass of constitutional nationalist thinking in both North and 
South. Not only do I make that wider claim, but I also further claim 
that the SDLP has radically changed the thinking of physical force 
nationalism or republicanism as well. (Maginness, 2002, p. 33) 
Notwithstanding the ostentatious nature of this assertion – and indeed 
despite the fact that it is made by a member of the SDLP – it has credibility. 
With its birth in August 1970, the SDLP became the primary political 
expression of the reformist tendencies that emerged within northern Irish 
nationalism in the 1960s. Throughout the 1970s, the party consolidated this 
position by articulating a discourse and approach to the Northern Ireland 
problem that departed significantly from traditional anti-partitionist 
nationalism. Even in this early period, the SDLP enjoyed considerable 
influence within Irish government circles, but the real breakthrough came 
with the New Ireland Forum of 1983-4. With this, the party had opportunity 
to fully imbue the southern state with its political philosophy (Murray, 1998, 
pp. 123, 141), and hereafter successive Irish governments adopted a 
distinctively SDLP phraseology. In turn, the London government also took 
on something of the SDLP‟s discourse. This was evident in the AIA of 1985, 
and even more so the DSD of 1993, after which the two governments were 
united in their use of a lexicon at least partly conditioned by the terminology 
of Hume and his party. However, as Maginness points out, the SDLP also 
helped to change the thinking of physical force republicanism. Clearly, it was 
aided in this effort by the willingness of the British government to confirm 
the arguments which the party had made to Sinn Féin. But looking at the 
particular formulations which figures such as Peter Brooke chose to use, it 
seems that by the early 1990s Hume had established a direct line of 
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communication with the Northern Ireland Office, which was listening with 
great interest.    
There is, however, one party to the Northern Ireland conflict who have 
proved impervious to “Humespeak”. Ulster unionists have retained a 
particular distrust for Hume and his discourse. Cunningham suggests that 
this is a result of the perceived ambiguities in Hume‟s political language. 
Demonstrating his point, Cunningham provides a quotation from a Protestant 
clergyman which he suggests “neatly encapsulates criticisms that have been 
levelled at John Hume”: 
Protestants are really puzzled by what they feel is the ambiguous 
attitude of Catholics and their failure to define ordinary concepts in a 
clean, straightforward way … Protestants sometimes find it very 
difficult to understand the sophistry, the playing with words which we 
(sometimes) get from Catholics (Cunningham, 1997, p. 13). 
Perhaps the best example of such “sophistry” is Hume‟s “agreed 
Ireland”. For many unionists, this phrase provided the “verbal sleight of 
hand” by which Hume disguised his true ambition (Bew and Patterson, 1985, 
p. 99). Put simply, an agreed Ireland was Humespeak for a united Ireland. 
(O‟Brien, 1994, p. 177). However, the unionist reading of Hume‟s agreed 
Ireland underestimates the extent to which the concept allowed Irish 
nationalists, and particularly northern Irish nationalists, to accept a political 
settlement which fell short of a united Ireland. It did so by promising 
constitutional arrangements with an all-Ireland dimension, structures which 
allowed northern nationalists to feel some form of political association with 
the Irish Republic, the state which best represented their national identity. At 
the same time, an agreed Ireland offered the same for unionists – that the 
institutions created would respect their rights and identity, and would require 
their consent. This, at its most basic level, is what Hume‟s agreed Ireland 
was all about. It was an attempt to square the circle between Irish 
nationalism and Ulster unionism, to provide political structures which would 
satisfy both. With the GFA, this Herculean task may have been 
accomplished. The 1998 Agreement has, for the first time in Irish history, 
created institutions which have secured widespread acceptance amongst both 
political traditions on the island.
6
 The GFA has achieved an agreed Ireland, 
and Hume and the SDLP have played no small part in this.    
 
Endnotes 
 
*
 I would like to acknowledge the support of the Irish Research Council for 
the Humanities and Social Sciences in carrying out this research. I am also 
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grateful to Jennifer Todd and the editors for their constructive comments. All 
errors are my own. 
 
1
 An appreciation of the SDLP‟s place within the wider process of change in 
Irish nationalist discourse can be gained by reading this piece in conjunction 
with the article by O‟Donnell in this volume, and those by Hayward (2004), 
Ivory (1999), and Shirlow and McGovern (1998). 
2
 For an overview of the different institutions of the GFA, see O‟Leary 
(2001).   
3
 Northern Ireland comprises six of the 32 counties of Ireland. However, 
Irish nationalists have traditionally used the term “the six counties” as a 
means to delegitimise the Northern Ireland state. The implication is that the 
“six counties” are only a part of what would be a more “natural” political 
unit: a 32 county united Ireland.  
4
 For a detailed discussion of this thinking, see McLoughlin (2006). 
5
 FitzGerald had been thinking in similar terms, but modified Hume‟s idea of 
a convention of Irish nationalist parties to one which would, at least in 
principle, be open to Ulster unionist contributions (FitzGerald, 1991, pp. 
462ff.). FitzGerald and Hume were alike in much of their political thinking, 
and their convergence over the New Ireland Forum initiative shows just one 
example of the overlap and interplay between revisionist nationalist 
tendencies in both parts of Ireland. 6 
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“six counties” are only a part of what would be a more “natural” political 
unit: a 32 county united Ireland.  
4
 For a detailed discussion of this thinking, see McLoughlin (2006). 
5
 FitzGerald had been thinking in similar terms, but modified Hume‟s idea of 
a convention of Irish nationalist parties to one which would, at least in 
principle, be open to Ulster unionist contributions (FitzGerald, 1991, pp. 
462ff.). FitzGerald and Hume were alike in much of their political thinking, 
and their convergence over the New Ireland Forum initiative shows just one 
example of the overlap and interplay between revisionist nationalist 
tendencies in both parts of Ireland. 
6
 Exit polls suggested that the GFA won only a slim majority of support 
among the unionist community in the 1998 referendum. Unionists‟ 
traditional aversion to power sharing with nationalists was clearly 
exacerbated by the prospect of republicans also participating in the 
government of Northern Ireland. Following this, the failure of the IRA to 
decommission its weapons, allied to instances of continued republican 
paramilitary activity and Sinn Féin‟s refusal to accept new policing 
arrangements in Northern Ireland, saw unionist backing for the GFA fall 
further. However, more recently, the resolution of these issues appears to 
have assured unionists of republicans‟ commitment to purely democratic 
methods. Accordingly, most sections of the Protestant community have now, 
if not embraced, at least accepted the GFA as providing the most equitable 
solution for the stable governance of Northern Ireland.   
 
 
 
References 
 
Adams, G. Hope and History: Making Peace in Ireland. Dingle: Brandon, 
2003. 
Bew, P., Gibbon, P., and Patterson, H. Northern Ireland, 1921-2001: 
Political Forces and Social Classes. London: Serif, 2002. 
Bew, P., and Patterson, H. The British State and the Ulster Crisis: From 
Wilson to Thatcher. London: Verso, 1985. 
Cunningham, M. “The Political Language of John Hume.” Irish Political 
Studies, 1997 12, 13–22. 
Dublin Stationery Office, New Ireland Forum Report. Dublin: Dublin 
Stationery Office, 1984. 
English, R. Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA. London: Macmillan, 2003. 
“Humespeak”: The SDLP  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 113 - 
 
FitzGerald, G. All in a Life: An Autobiography. London: Gill and Macmillan, 
1991. 
Hayward, K. “The Politics of Nuance: Irish Official Discourse on Northern 
Ireland.” Irish Political Studies, 2004, 19 (1), 18–38. 
Hennessy, T. The Northern Ireland Peace Process: Ending the Troubles? 
Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2000. 
HMSO. The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion. London: 
Her Majesty‟s Stationery Office [HMSO], 1972.   
HMSO. Text of the Joint Declaration by the Prime Minister, Rt. Hon. John 
Major, MP and the Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, TD on the 15th 
December, 1993 [the Downing Street Declaration]. Belfast: HMSO, 
1993. 
HMSO. Framework Documents: Including Part 1 – A Framework for 
Accountable Government in Northern Ireland produced by Government 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Part 2 – A New Framework 
for Agreement produced by Government of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and Government of Republic of Ireland. Belfast: HMSO, 1995.  
HMSO. Agreement Reached at the Multi-Party Talks on Northern Ireland 
[the Good Friday Agreement]. London: HMSO, 1998. 
Hume, J. Opening speech to the New Ireland Forum, 30 May 1983. In New 
Ireland Forum Public Sessions: Report of Proceedings, no. 1. Dublin: 
Dublin Stationery Office, 1984. 
Hume, J. A New Ireland: Peace, Politics and Reconciliation. Boulder: 
Roberts Rinehart, 1996. 
Hume, J. “A New Ireland – The Acceptance of Diversity.” Studies, 1986, 75, 
300, 378–83 
Hume, J. Letter to Gerry Adams, March 17th 1988. Linen Hall Library, 
Northern Ireland Political Collection, P3395 
Ivory, G. “Revisions in Nationalist Discourse among Irish Political Parties.” 
Irish Political Studies, 1999, 14, 84–103. 
Maginness, A. “Redefining Northern Nationalism.” In J. Coakley (ed.) 
Changing Shades of Orange and Green: Redefining the Union and the 
Nation in Contemporary Ireland. Dublin: UCD Press, 2002.  
Mallie, É., and McKittrick, D. The Fight for Peace: the Secret Story behind 
the Irish Peace Process. London:  Heinemann, 1996. 
McGovern, M. “Unity in Diversity? The SDLP and the Peace Process.” In C. 
Gilligan and J. Tonge (eds.), Peace or War? Understanding the Peace 
Process in Northern Ireland, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997. 
McLoughlin, P. J. „“A United Ireland or Nothing”?: John Hume and the Idea 
of Irish Unity, 1964–72.” Irish Political Studies, 2006, 21 (2), 157–80.  
“Humespeak”: The SDLP  
 
Peace and Conflict Studies • Volume 15, Number 1 
- 114 - 
 
Murray, G. John Hume and the SDLP: Impact and Survival in Northern 
Ireland. Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1998. 
O‟Brien, C. C. Ancestral Voices: Religion and Nationalism in Ireland. 
Dublin: Poolbeg, 1994.  
O‟Leary, B. “The Character of the 1998 Agreement: Results and Prospects.” 
In R. Wilford (ed.), Aspects of the Belfast Agreement. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001. 
Ruane, J. and Todd, J. “The Belfast Agreement: Context, Content, 
Consequences.” In J. Ruane and J. Todd (eds.), After the Good Friday 
Agreement: Analysing Political Change in Northern Ireland. Dublin: 
UCD Press, 1999. 
SDLP. Towards a New Ireland. Belfast: SDLP, 1972. 
SDLP. Joint statement by the SDLP Executive Committee and Assembly 
Party, 3
rd
 September, 1974. Public Records Office of Northern Ireland, 
D/3072/4/1/1.  
SDLP. “SDLP Offers Agreed Ireland”, 18th June, 1974. Public Records 
Office of Northern Ireland, D/3072/4/1/1. 
SDLP. Speak with Strength. Belfast: SDLP, 1975. 
Shirlow, P., and McGovern, M. “Language, Discourse and Dialogue: Sinn 
Féin and the Irish Peace Process.” Political Geography, 1998, 17, 2 
171–186.   
Sinn Féin. The Hillsborough Agreement: The Text of the Bobby Sands 
Commemorative Lecture Given by Danny Morrison in Twinbrook, 
Belfast, on Sunday 4
th
 May, 1986. Belfast: Sinn Féin, 1986. 
Sinn Féin, “Towards a Strategy for Peace”, March 14th 1988. Linen Hall 
Library, Northern Ireland Political Collection, P3394. 
Todd, J. “Equality, Plurality and Democracy: Justifications of 
Proposed  
Constitutional Settlements of the Northern Ireland Conflict.” Ethnic 
and Racial Studies, 1995, 18 (4), 818–836.  
White, B. John Hume: Statesman of the Troubles. Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 
1984. 
Whyte, J. Interpreting Northern Ireland. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1990. 
 
 
